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relationship with another variable U and information about U. We consider two
approaches, one using the fuzzy set based theory of approximate reasoning and the other
using probabilistic reasoning. Both of these approaches allow the inclusion of imprecise
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sented using a Dempster–Shafer belief structure. We then compare these values and show
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 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Assume U and V are two variables an important step in many information processing and decision making tasks is infer-
ring information about the value of the variable V from knowledge of some relationship between variables U and V and data
about the value of U. Two common ways of modeling relationships between variables are with the aid of probabilistic and
fuzzy rule-based representations. One shared feature of both these representations is their facility for allowing the types of
granular information common to human perception [1–3] in the describing relationships. Thus if A is a subset of the domain
of some variable U both representations allow the use of granular statements such as U is A to indicate that the value of U lies
in the set A. The use of this granularization allows for the modeling of imprecision in our knowledge. As discussed by Zadeh
[4,5], Bargiela and Pedrycz [6] and Lin et al. [7] granularization and the related idea of granular computing play an important
role in the development of computational intelligence.
In this work, we look two methods for performing inference task described above. The ﬁrst is with the aid Zadeh’s frame-
work of approximate reasoning [8,9] in which we use a rule-like representation to describe the relationship between the two
variables. The second is with aid of probabilistic reasoning in which we use conditional probability to express our
relationship.
Once having determined the inferred value for V using each of these two technologies we express these two inferred
values in a uniﬁed framework using the Dempster–Shafer belief structures. Having a common representational framework
we then compare and relate the results of these two approaches to determine the underlying commonality between them.
As a result of this comparison we see a uniﬁed view if the inference process and in turn get a deeper understanding this
process.. All rights reserved.
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We here consider the approximate reasoning protoform of modus ponens [10–12]. In this protoform, we have two
propositions
P1: If U is A then V is B
P2: U is D
where U and V are variables taking their values in X and Y, respectively. In this protoform A and D are fuzzy subsets of X and B
is a fuzzy subset of Y.
Using the representational capability of the theory of approximate reasoning [8,13] we get that P1 is represented as1 WeðU;VÞ is H:
Here (U,V) is a joint variable and H is a fuzzy subset of X x Y with Hðx; yÞ ¼ AðxÞ _ BðyÞ and where A is the complement of
A;AðxÞ ¼ 1 AðxÞ [8].
To obtain the inference from P1 and P2 we take their conjunction and get (U,V) is M whereMðx; yÞ ¼ Hðx; yÞ ^ DðxÞ ¼ ðAðxÞ _ BðyÞÞ ^ DðxÞ ¼ ðAðxÞ ^ DðxÞÞ _ ðBðyÞ ^ ðDðxÞÞ:
To get the resulting inference V is E where E is a fuzzy subset of Y we project onto Y and obtainEðyÞ ¼ Maxx½Mðx; yÞ ¼ Maxx½ðAðxÞ ^ DðxÞÞ _ ðBðyÞ ^ DðxÞÞ;
EðyÞ ¼ Maxx½AðxÞ ^ DðxÞ _ ðBðyÞ ^Maxx½DðxÞÞ:Under the assumption that D is normal1, has at least one element with membership grade equal 1, we get [14]EðyÞ ¼ Poss½A=D _ BðyÞ;
where Poss½A=D ¼ Maxx½AðxÞ ^ DðxÞ:
Recalling [4] that Cert½A=D ¼ 1 Poss½A=D we can also express this inference as
EðyÞ ¼ ð1 Cert½A=DÞ _ BðyÞ:We see that if Cert[A/D] = 1 then we get E(y) = B(y) and hence our inference is V is B, the rule has completely ﬁred. At the
other extreme if Cert[A/D] = 0 then we get E(y) = 1 and we obtain V is Y, no information has been obtained.
We recall another protoform from approximate reasoning is related to the translation of certainty qualiﬁcation [14]. Un-
der this protoform a propositionðV is GÞ is k Certain
can be translated as V is H where HðyÞ ¼ GðyÞ _ k. ðk ¼ 1 kÞ:
Using this if we let a ¼ Poss½A=D then we can alternatively express the results of the modus ponens protoform as
ðV is BÞ is a Certain;this is the same as V is E where E(y) = a _ B(y).
In the special case when our sets are crisp, not fuzzy sets, then Poss½A=D 2 f0;1g. In particularPoss½A=D ¼ 0 if D#A;
Poss½A=D ¼ 1 if DåA:Thus if D # A then a = 0 and we get E(y) = B(y) _ a = B(y) and we infer V is B. On the other hand, if D åA then a = 1 and
E(y) = B(y) _ a = 1 and E = Y. Here we infer that V can be anything.
We should observe that within P1 there is an implicit third proposition. Essentially the implication P1 tells us when U is
(not A) the value of V can be anything. This is formally captured by the propositionP3 : If U is not A then V is Y :We can see that this is implicit in the proposition P1 as follows. We ﬁrst observe that P3 is representable as (U,V) is G where
G(x,y) = A(x) _ Y(y). To see that G is implicit in H we note that G \ H = R whereRðx; yÞ ¼ ðAðxÞ _ BðyÞÞ ^ ðAðxÞ _ YðyÞÞ;
Rðx; yÞ ¼ ðAðxÞ ^ AðxÞÞ _ ðAðxÞ ^ YðyÞÞ _ ðBðyÞ ^ AðxÞÞ _ ðBðyÞ ^ YðyÞÞ;
Rðx; yÞ ¼ ðAðxÞ _ BðyÞ ¼ Hðx; yÞ:Thus P3 is implicit in P1.note normality of D is equivalent to saying D is not null in the crisp case.
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We now consider an alternate approach for making an inference about V using a probabilistic method. Here we assume
the same information as in the preceding protoform except it is represented in probabilistic form2
S-1: P(B/A) = 1
S-2: P(D) = 1
S-3: PðB=AÞ ¼ unknown
In this section, our interest is in the obtaining the probability of V is B, which we will denote as P(B). In this case, as is well
known2 In tPðBÞ ¼ PðB=AÞPðAÞ þ PðB=AÞPðAÞ:
Since P(B/A) = 1 we havePðBÞ ¼ PðAÞ þ PðB=AÞPðAÞ:
With PðAÞ ¼ 1 PðAÞ we getPðBÞ ¼ PðAÞ þ PðB=AÞð1 PðAÞÞ:
Furthermore, we can expressPðAÞ ¼ PðA=DÞPðDÞ þ PðA=DÞPðDÞ:
Since P(D) = 1 then PðDÞ ¼ 1 PðDÞ ¼ 0 hence we havePðAÞ ¼ PðA=DÞ ¼ 1 PðA=DÞ:
If we let k ¼ PðA=DÞ then P(A) = (1  k). Using this in our expression for P(B) we getPðBÞ ¼ kPðB=AÞ þ ð1 kÞ
were PðB=AÞ is the value unknown. We note that a probability value of unknown can be represented as a set consisting of the
unit interval I = [0,1]. Using this we havePðBÞ ¼ ð1 kÞ þ k½0;1 ¼ ð1 kÞ þ ½0; k ¼ ½1 k;1:
Thus P(B) is some value in the interval 1  k to 1. Linguistically this can be expressed as saying that the value of P(B) is ‘‘at
least 1  k”.4. Comparison using Dempster–Shafer representation
Recapitulating, from the ﬁrst method, using approximate reasoning techniques we have inferred V is E where
E(y) = B(y) _ a. As we indicated this is semantically equivalent to sayingðV is BÞ with a Certainty;
where a ¼ Poss½A=D ¼ Maxx½AðxÞ ^ DðxÞ. We note that a is the largest membership grade in the intersection of the sets A and
D.
Using the probabilistic approach we have obtainedProbðV is BÞ ¼ kProbðB=AÞ þ ð1 kÞ;
ProbðV is BÞ ¼ ½1 k;1:As we indicated this is semantically to saying that the probability V lies in the set B is at least 1  k where
k ¼ PropðA=DÞ ¼ PðA\DÞPðDÞ . Since we assumed Prob(D) = 1 then k ¼ ProbðA \ DÞ.
In order to relate these results we shall use the Dempster–Shafer framework [3,15], it will allow us to represent both of
these in a uniﬁed framework as belief structures on Y.
First for the inference from the approximate reasoning approach, V is E, we can represent this as a D–S belief structurem1
on Y that has one focal element, the fuzzy subset E, with weight m1(E) = 1. Here E(y) = B(y) _ a with
a ¼ Poss½A=D ¼ Maxx½AðxÞ ^ DðxÞ.
For the second case, where we used a probabilistic approach and obtained that the Probability that V is in B is at least
1  k, we can represent this with a belief structure m2 on Y with two focal elements B and Y such thathe following we use the notation P(B/A) and P(D) instead of the more cumbersome notation P(V is B/U is A) and P(U is D).
3 We
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m2ðYÞ ¼ k:Here k ¼ ProbðA=DÞ.
We now can calculate the plausibility and belief of some arbitrary set G under these two belief structures. That is the
plausibility and belief that V lies in G.
First we recall [16] for any belief structuremwith focal elements Bi, i = 1 to Kwe deﬁne the plausibility measure such that
for any subset GPlðGÞ ¼
XK
i¼1
Poss½G=BimðBiÞ:We deﬁne the belief measure such that for any subset GBelðGÞ ¼
XK
i¼1
Cert½G=BimðBiÞ:In the above Poss[G/Bi] = Maxy[G(y) ^ Bi(y)] and Cert½G=Bi ¼ 1 Poss½G=Bi.
Using this we obtain for the belief structure m1 which has the single focal element FPl1ðGÞ ¼ Poss½G=F ¼ Maxy½GðyÞ ^ FðyÞ;
Pl1ðGÞ ¼ Maxy½GðyÞ ^ ðBðyÞ _ aÞ;
Pl1ðGÞ ¼ Maxy½ðGðyÞ ^ BðyÞÞ _Maxy½a ^ GðyÞ:Assuming G is normal, i.e. has one element with membership grade one, we getPl1ðGÞ ¼ Poss½G=B _ a:
For m2 with two focal elements, B and Y, we getPl2ðGÞ ¼ ð1 kÞPoss½G=B þ kPoss½G=Y:
Under the assumed normality of G we get Poss[G/Y] = 1 and hence we havePl2ðGÞ ¼ ð1 kÞPoss½G=B þ k:
A uniﬁcation of these two results can be useful in providing us a deeper and more uniﬁed understanding of the inference
process. We now turn to providing this uniﬁcation. We ﬁrst recall the t-conorm operator, which provides a generalization
the logical’or’ operator [17]. A t-conorm S is a mapping S: [0,1]2? [0,1] having the properties
(1) Symmetry: S(a,b) = S(b,a)
(2) Monotonicity: S(a,b)P S(c,d) if aP c and bP d
(3) Associativity: S(a,S(b,c)) = S(S(a,b),c)
(4) 0 as identity: S(0,a) = a
Two important examples of t-conorm are the Max and probabilistic sumSMða; bÞ ¼ Maxða; bÞ ¼ a _ b;
SPða; bÞ ¼ aþ b ab ¼ bþ að1 bÞ:We see then thatPl1ðGÞ ¼ SM½Poss½G=B;a;
Pl2ðGÞ ¼ SP½Poss½G=B; k;where we recall a ¼ Poss½A=D and k ¼ Prob½A=D.
Thus a semantic interpretation of the plausibility of G is degree of possibility of G given B or the feasibility3 of not A given
D.
We now consider the measure of belief. In the case of the belief structure m1, we haveBel1ðGÞ ¼ CertðG=FÞ ¼ 1 Poss½G=F ¼ 1Maxy½GðyÞ ^ FðyÞ;
Bel1ðGÞ ¼ 1Maxy½GðyÞ ^ ðBðyÞ _ aÞ;
Bel1ðGÞ ¼ 1Maxy½ðGðyÞ ^ BðyÞÞ _ ðGðyÞ ^ aÞ;
Bel1ðGÞ ¼ 1 ðMaxy½GðyÞ ^ BðyÞ _Maxy½GðyÞ ^ aÞ;are using the term feasibility to generalize the ideas of possibility and probability.
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Bel1ðGÞ ¼ Cert½G=B ^ ða _Miny½GðyÞÞ;
Bel1ðGÞ ¼ ða ^ Cert½G=BÞ _ ðMiny½GðyÞ ^ Cert½G=BÞ:For the case of the belief structure m2 we haveBel2ðGÞ ¼ ð1 kÞCert½G=B þ kCert½G=Y:
We observe that CertðG=YÞ ¼ 1 Poss½G=Y. We also note thatPoss½G=Y  ¼ Maxy½GðyÞ ¼ 1Miny½GðyÞ:
Hence Cert(G/Y) = Miny[G(y)]. Thus weBel2ðGÞ ¼ ð1 kÞCertðG=BÞ þ kMiny½GðyÞ:
We now consider a uniﬁcation of these two formulations. To do this we recall the t-norm operator which provides a gener-
alization of the ’Anding’ operator [17]. A t-norm is a mapping T:[0,1]2? [0,1] which has the same ﬁrst three properties as
the t-conorm, symmetry, monotonicity and associativity, but it has one as is identity, T(1,a) = a. Two important examples of
t-norms are Min and productTMða; bÞ ¼ a ^ b Min;
TPða; bÞ ¼ ab Product:Consider now the two formulations we just obtainedBel1ðGÞ ¼ Cert½G=B ^ ða _Miny½GðyÞÞ;
Bel2ðGÞ ¼ ð1 kÞCert½G=B þ kMinyGðyÞ:First we observe thatCert½G=Y  ¼ Miny½GðyÞ _ YðyÞ ¼ Miny½GðyÞ:
Thus Miny[G(y)] is the certainty of V is G in the case when we know nothing about V, that is V is Y. Thus we seeBel1ðGÞ ¼ Cert½G=B ^ ða _ Cert½G=YÞ;
Bel1ðGÞ ¼ ða ^ Cert½G=BÞ _ ðCert½G=Y ^ Cert½G=BÞ:However, since Cert½G=Y ¼ 1 Poss½G=Y  and Cert½G=B ¼ 1 Poss½G=B and B # Y then Cert[G/Y] 6 Cert[G/B] and hence
Bel1ðGÞ ¼ ða ^ Cert½G=BÞ _ Cert½G=Y:For the case of m2 we have thatBel2ðGÞ ¼ kCert½G=B þ kCert½G=Y :
Let us consider the important special case where Cert(G/Y) = Miny[G(y)] = 0. Here we are saying G is such that if we have no
information about V we cannot say anything with certainty about V is G. In this case we haveBel1ðGÞ ¼ a ^ Cert½G=B;
Bel2ðGÞ ¼ kCert½G=B:Using the idea of t-norm we see thatBel1ðGÞ ¼ TMða;Cert½G=BÞ;
Bel2ðGÞ ¼ TPðk;Cert½G=BÞ:Furthermore, since a ¼ PossðA=DÞ then 1 a ¼ 1 Poss½A=D ¼ Cert½A=D hence
Bel1ðGÞ ¼ TMðCert½A=D;Cert½G=BÞ ¼ Cert½A=D ^ Cert½G=B;
Bel1ðGÞ ¼ Cert½A=D and Cert½G=B:Recalling now that k ¼ ProbðA=DÞ and hence 1 k ¼ ProbðA=DÞ we get that
Bel2ðGÞ ¼ TP½ProbðA=DÞ;Cert½G=Bthus Bel2(G) = Prob(A/D) and Cert[G/B].
Again we have a similar interpreter as the feasibility of A given D and the certainty of G given B.
Let us now return to the more general case withBel1ðGÞ ¼ Cert½G=Y _ ða ^ Cert½G=BÞ;
Bel2ðGÞ ¼ kCert½G=B þ kCert½G=Y:
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in a subBel2ðGÞ ¼ kCert½G=B þ kCert½G=Y þ kCert½G=Y  kCert½G=Y ;
Bel2ðGÞ ¼ Cert½G=Y  þ kCert½G=B  Cert½G=Y Þ:We see thatBel1ðGÞ ¼ TMðCert½G=BÞ; aÞ or Cert½G=Y;
Bel2ðGÞ ¼ TPðCert½G=B; kÞ þ TPðCert½G=B; kÞ:We can writeBel1ðGÞ ¼ TMðCert½G=B; aÞ or TMðCert½G=Y;1Þ:
Let us provide an overview and uniﬁcation of the preceding as we shall see this will give us an interesting protoform of
reasoning.
We have two variables U and V and some relationship or association between these variables telling us that knowing that
U is A allows us to conclude that V is B. We refer to this as U is A jV is B.
In the current situation we know that U is D and our objective is to say something about V. In the following we shall let c
indicate the feasibility of U is A given U is D. Let G be any subset of Y in the following we assume Cert[G/Y] = 0. We can now
calculatePlðGÞ ¼ ðPoss½G=B or cÞ ¼ SðPoss½G=B; cÞ;
CertðGÞ ¼ ðCert½G=B and cÞ ¼ TðCert½G=B; cÞIn this situation the choice of S and T depends on the method of measuring the feasibility c.5. Calculating the pignistic measure
As discussed in [18] a Dempster–Shafer belief structure can be viewed as a representation of our knowledge about the
underlying measure associated with a variable. In this framework the measures of plausibility and belief are two measures
compatible with the given belief structure. As a matter of fact they are extreme measures. Plausibility is the measure that
assigns the largest value to any subset while the belief always assigns the smallest value to the subset.4 Another measure
is one closely related to Smets’ concept of pignistic probability [19,20]. We ﬁrst brieﬂy describe this measure and then calculate
it for the two cases of belief structure we have earlier obtained.
Assumem is a belief structure with focal elements Bi, i = 1 to q, with associated weight m(Bi). The pignistic measure asso-
ciated with m is deﬁned such that for any set GPigðGÞ ¼
Xq
i¼1
CardðBi \ GÞ
CardðBiÞ mðBiÞ:Here CardðBiÞ ¼
P
xj2XBiðxjÞ and CardðBi \ GÞ ¼
P
xj2XðBiðxjÞ ^ GðxjÞÞ. The pignistic measure assigns to G a portion of the weight
associated with a focal element Bi in proportion to the fraction of the elements lying in Bi that also lie in G. We note in the
special case where B and G are crisp sets then Card(Bi) is the number of elements in Bi and Card(Bi \ G) is the number of ele-
ments in Bi that are also in G.
Consider now the case where our knowledge ism1 where we have one focal element Fwhere F(y) = B(y) _ a andm1(F) = 1.
In this casePig1ðGÞ ¼
CardðF \ GÞ
CardðFÞ ¼
P
yððBðyÞ ^ GðyÞÞ _ ða ^ GðyÞÞÞP
yðBðyÞ _ aÞ
:If we let Y be divided into two classes Y1 and Y2 such that B(y)P a for all y 2 Y1 and B(y) < a for all y 2 Y2 thenPig1ðGÞ ¼
P
y2Y1 ðBðyÞ ^ GðyÞÞ þ
P
y2Y2 ða ^ GðyÞÞP
y2Y1 ðBðyÞ þ ajY2j
:jY2j being the cardinality of Y2. We can alternatively express Pig1(G) asPig1ðGÞ ¼
P
y2YðBðyÞ ^ GðyÞÞ þ
P
y2Y2 ðða ^ GðyÞ  ðBðyÞ ^ GðyÞÞÞP
YðBðyÞ þ
P
y2Y2 ða BðyÞÞ
:itively we can view plausibility as the measure compatible with the D–S structure that assigns the largest expectation to ﬁnding the value of a variable
set. The belief assigns the smallest. Plausibility is an optimistic type measure while belief is a pessimistic one.
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P
y2GðBðyÞ _ aÞP
y2YðBðyÞ _ aÞ
:In the further special case where G is a singleton, G = {y*}, thenPig1ðfygÞ ¼
BðyÞ _ aP
YðBðyÞ _ aÞ
:If a = 1 then we have Pig1ðfygÞ ¼ 1jYj, it is simply unknown. If a = 0 thenPig1ðfygÞ ¼
BðyÞP
yBðyÞ
:Let us consider the calculation of Pig2(G) for m2 wherem2ðBÞ ¼ 1 k;
m2ðYÞ ¼ k:In this casePig2ðGÞ ¼
CardðB \ GÞ
CardðBÞ 
kþ CardðG \ YÞ
CardðYÞ k;
Pig2ðGÞ ¼
P
yBðyÞ ^ GðyÞP
yBðyÞ
 kþ CardGjYj k:We can express this asPig2ðGÞ ¼
1
CardðBÞ
kCardðB \ GÞ þ kCardðBÞCardðGÞ
CardðYÞ
 
;
Pig2ðGÞ ¼
1
CardðBÞ ðCardðB \ GÞ þ k
CardðBÞCardðGÞ
CardðYÞ  CardðB \ GÞ
 
:For the case where G is a singleton, G = {y*} thenPig2ðfygÞ ¼ k
BðyÞ
CardðBÞ þ k
1
CardðYÞ :We recall that for the case of m1 we hadPig1ðfygÞ ¼
BðyÞ _ aP
yBðyÞ _ a
¼ Fðy
Þ
CardðFÞ :6. Reasoning with partially certain relationships
We now generalize the above situation by associating with our relationship between U is A and V is B a degree of validity,
certainty in the case of approximate reasoning and probability is the case of probabilistic reasoning.
We consider ﬁrst the modus ponens protoform from approximate reasoning. Here we start withP10 : If U is A then V is B with q certainty:In addition, we still have the statementP2 : U is D:We can represent P10, using the representational capability of approximate reasoning asðU;VÞ is H;
where Hðx; yÞ ¼ AðxÞ _ BðyÞ _ q.
Conjuncting this with our knowledge from P2 we getðU;VÞ is M;
where Mðx; yÞ ¼ ðAðxÞ _ BðyÞ _ qÞ ^ DðxÞ:
To get the resulting inference, V is E, we calculateEðyÞ ¼ Maxx½ðAðxÞ ^ DðxÞÞ _ ðq ^ DðxÞÞ _ ðBðyÞ ^ DðxÞÞ:
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Denoting Poss½A=D ¼ a we get EðyÞ ¼ a _ q _ BðyÞ. Since Poss½A=D is the same as (1  Cert[A/D]) we can also express
this asEðyÞ ¼ ð1 Cert½A=DÞ _ ð1 qÞ _ BðyÞ:
We see that if q = 1, then this reduces to the earlier case, E(y) = a _ B(y). On the other hand, if q = 0, no conﬁdence in the rule
P1, then E(y) = a _ 1 _ B(y) = 1. Here E = Y and we infer nothing about the value of V. We further observe that if Cert[A/D] = 0,
Poss½A=D ¼ 1, we also get E = Y.
Consider now the probabilistic representation of our knowledge. Here we assume
S-10: P(B/A) = q
S-2: P(D) = 1
S-3: PðB=AÞ – unknown
In this case we havePðBÞ ¼ PðB=AÞPðAÞ þ PðB=AÞPðAÞ ¼ qPðAÞ þ PðB=AÞPðAÞ;
PðBÞ ¼ qPðAÞ þ PðB=AÞð1 PðAÞÞ:As in the preceding we havePðAÞ ¼ PðA=DÞPðDÞ þ PðA=DÞPðDÞ
with P(D) = 1 we get PðAÞ ¼ PðA=DÞ ¼ 1 PðA=DÞ. Denoting k ¼ PðA=DÞ then P(A) = 1  k and hence we havePðBÞ ¼ kqþ kPðB=AÞ
with PðB=AÞ ¼ ½0;1, unknown, we havePðBÞ ¼ kqþ k½0;1 ¼ kqþ ½0; k;
PðBÞ ¼ ½kq; kqþ k:We see in this case if q = 1 then PðBÞ ¼ ½k;1. This is the earlier value. In this case where q = 0 we get P(B) = [0,k].
Consider PðBÞ ¼ ½kq; kqþ k it is worth noting thatkq ¼ TPðk;qÞ;
kqþ k ¼ ð1 kÞqþ k ¼ kþ q kq ¼ Spðk;qÞ:Thus we have that PðBÞ ¼ ½q and not k;q or k.
The Dempster–Shafer representation of the ﬁrst case the one using approximate reasoning is a belief structure m3 with
one focal element F where FðyÞ ¼ a _ q _ BðyÞ and m3(F) = 1.
In this case for any subset G we get the plausibilityPl3ðGÞ ¼ Poss½G=B _ a _ q;
Pl3ðGÞ ¼ SM½PossðG=BÞ;a; q:For the belief of G under m3 we getBel3ðGÞ ¼ Cert½G=F ¼ Cert½G=B ^ ðða _ qÞ _Miny½GðyÞÞ;
Bel3ðGÞ ¼ Cert½G=B ^ ða ^ q _MinyðGðyÞÞ:If Miny[G(y)] = Cert[G/Y] = 0 then we getBel3ðGÞ ¼ Cert½G=B ^ a ^ q;
Bel3ðGÞ ¼ TMðCert½G=B; a;qÞ:At this point it is worth noting the duality relationship between t-norms and t-conorms. In particular for any t-norm there
exists a dual t-conorm such that Tða; bÞ ¼ 1 Sða; bÞ [21]. We further recall that Min and Max are duals,
TMða; bÞ ¼ 1 SMða; bÞ. Making use of this duality we see thatBel3ðGÞ  TMðCert½G=P; a;qÞ ¼ 1 SMðCert½G=B;a; qÞ:Further recalling that Cert½G=B ¼ 1 Poss½G=B then we have
Cert½G=B ¼ 1 ð1 Poss½G=BÞ ¼ Poss½G=B:
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Bel3ðGÞ ¼ 1 Pl3ðGÞ:The belief of G is the complement of the plausibility of the complement of G.
We now consider the D–S representation of the probabilistic inferencePðBÞ ¼ ðkq; kþ kqÞ:
We ﬁrst observe that1 qk ¼ 1 ð1 kÞð1 qÞ ¼ 1 ð1 q kþ qkÞ ¼ qþ k qk ¼ kþ qk:
Using this we see thatPðBÞ ¼ ½kq;1 qk:
From this we can represent this as a D–S belief structure m4 with three focal elementsm4ðBÞ ¼ kq;
m4ðBÞ ¼ qk;
m4ðYÞ ¼ k:With this we can calculate for any subset GPl4ðGÞ ¼ Poss½G=Ykþ Poss½G=Bkqþ Poss½G=Bqk:
With G normal, Poss[G/Y] = 1, thenPl4ðGÞ ¼ kþ kðqPoss½G=B þ qPoss½G=BÞ;
Pl4ðGÞ ¼ SPðk; ðqPoss½G=B þ qPoss½G=BÞÞ:Here we seePl4ðGÞ ¼ k or ðqPoss½G=B þ qPoss½G=BÞ:
An interesting special case is when Poss½G=B ¼ 1, in this caseq Poss½G=B þ q Poss½G=BÞ ¼ qþ q Poss½G=B ¼ SPðq; Poss½G=BÞ:Hence in this case we getPl4½G ¼ SPðk; q;Poss½G=BÞ:
We now turn to the expression for the belief in this case of m4.Bel4½G ¼ kCert½G=Y þ kqCert½G=B þ qkCert½G=B;
Bel4½G ¼ kCert½G=Y þ kðqCert½G=B þ qCert½G=BÞ:In the case where Cert[G/Y] = Miny[G(y)] = 0 we get thenBel4½G ¼ kðqCert½G=B þ qCert½G=BÞ;
Bel4½G ¼ TPðk; ðCert½G=B þ qCert½G=BÞÞ:If we further assume here that Poss½G=B ¼ 1, then Cert½G=B ¼ 1 Poss½G=B ¼ 1 henceBel4½G ¼ TPðk;qCert½G=BÞ:7. Conclusion
We looked at the problem of inferring information about the value of a variable V using information about the value of
some other variable U and knowledge about a relationship between values of the variables U and V. Two approaches were
used. One used the Zadeh’s theory of approximate reasoning and the other used probabilistic reasoning. We pointed out that
both of these methods allowed for the inclusion of granular type information. This feature makes these methods compatible
with human type reasoning which strongly relies on the use of granular information. The inferred values from each of these
methods were expressed in the framework of Dempster–Shafer theory. We then showed an underling unity between these
R.R. Yager / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 812–821 821two approaches. This underlying unity can help provide a deeper understanding of the inference process in the case of gran-
ular imprecise information.
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